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The recent enactment of Regulation A+ makes it possible for the first time for companies
to conduct retail equity crowdfunding (i.e., equity crowdfunding campaigns involving general
solicitation of unaccredited investors). On its surface, Regulation A+ seems poised to provide dual
benefits to start-ups by both democratizing access to capital and easing the transition into public
company status. However, Regulation A+ is largely a solution in search of a problem. There is
little empirical evidence of an equity gap for early stage companies, nor is there evidence that the
recent dip in small-company IPOs has anything to do with regulatory burdens. While Regulation
A+’s two main raisons d’etre are likely misguided, the regulation may still provide modest, but
important, social benefits. Close enforcement is needed, however, to ensure these benefits do not
come at the cost of market integrity and potential losses to ordinary investors.
KEYWORDS: Crowdfunding, Regulation A+
  155
THE RIGHT DEED FOR THE WRONG REASON: A 
CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF REGULATION A+ 
AND ITS RATIONALES 
Louis Anthony Steiner* 
The recent enactment of Regulation A+ makes it possible for the first 
time for companies to conduct retail equity crowdfunding (i.e., equity 
crowdfunding campaigns involving general solicitation of 
unaccredited investors). On its surface, Regulation A+ seems poised 
to provide dual benefits to start-ups by both democratizing access to 
capital and easing the transition into public company status. However, 
Regulation A+ is largely a solution in search of a problem. There is 
little empirical evidence of an equity gap for early stage companies, 
nor is there evidence that the recent dip in small-company IPOs has 
anything to do with regulatory burdens. While Regulation A+’s two 
main raisons d’etre are likely misguided, the regulation may still 
provide modest, but important, social benefits. Close enforcement is 
needed, however, to ensure these benefits do not come at the cost of 
market integrity and potential losses to ordinary investors. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................ 157 
I. HISTORY AND IMPETUS FOR REGULATION A+ ....................... 160 
A. THE ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF SMALL FIRMS ................ 160 
B. REGULATION A AND ITS SHORTCOMINGS .......................... 163 
C. REGULATION A+ TO THE RESCUE ...................................... 164 
                                                                                                                 
* Louis Anthony “Tony” Steiner is an associate with Holland & Knight LLP. The views 
expressed in this Article are those of the author only, and are not necessarily shared or 
endorsed by Holland & Knight LLP or its partners. The author would like to thank 
Professor Quinn Curtis for his sound guidance regarding the topic and content of this 
Article, colleague David Cole for invaluable feedback and practical input, Professor 
Saras Sarasvathy for her excellent policy suggestions, and Joe Velk and John Cambier 
for lending their business perspective and insight. The author would also like to thank the 
editorial staff at the Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law (and especially 
Shrisha Juneja) for countless hours spent revising and improving the Article, and, last but 
not least, his family for their unwavering support and encouragement. All errors are his 
own. 
156 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XXII 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
II. THE “DEMOCRATIZING ACCESS TO CAPITAL” RATIONALE—
DOES IT HOLD UP? .............................................................. 166 
A. IS THERE A GENERAL UNDERSUPPLY OF RISK CAPITAL? .. 166 
B. IS THERE A REGIONAL EQUITY GAP? ................................ 168 
1. Venture Capitalist and Angel Investment Criteria ..... 169 
2. Regional Differences that May Explain Venture Capital 
Clustering ................................................................ 173 
3. What the Lack of a Regional Equity Gap Means for 
Regulation A+ .......................................................... 175 
C. SOCIAL REASONS TO ENCOURAGE CROWDFUNDING ......... 179 
1. Gender/Race Issues .................................................... 179 
2. Community Building .................................................. 182 
D. FINAL REMARKS ON “DEMOCRATIZING ACCESS TO CAPITAL” 
RATIONALE ..................................................................... 183 
III. EXAMINING THE IPO FACILITATION RATIONALE ............... 183 
A. THE NEED FOR IPOS ......................................................... 183 
B. SMALL COMPANY IPOS—DEAD FOR GOOD REASON? ...... 186 
IV. POTENTIAL PITFALLS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR 
ENFORCEMENT ..................................................................... 188 
A. POTENTIAL PITFALLS ........................................................ 189 
1. Behavioral Economics ............................................... 189 
2. The Lemons Problem ................................................. 190 
3. Dilution ...................................................................... 191 
4. Fraud .......................................................................... 193 
5. Decreased Protection from State Regulators ............. 194 
6. The Risks of Distant Ownership ................................. 195 
B. SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM .............................................. 195 
1. Anti-fraud Measures .................................................. 195 
2. Diversification ............................................................ 196 
3. Intrastate Emphasis ................................................... 198 
4. Syndication ................................................................. 198 
C. LIMITS OF SECURITIES LAW .............................................. 200 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................ 201 
 
2017]      THE RIGHT DEED FOR THE WRONG REASON 157 
INTRODUCTION 
It is estimated that over $5.1 billion in funds were raised via 
crowdfunding in 2013.1 Prosper and Lending Club, the two largest peer-
to-peer lenders, made $1.7 billion in loans in 2014, up from a mere $26 
million in 2009.2 Meanwhile, crowdfunding in real estate grew by 156% 
in 2014 to a total of over $1 billion.3 A recent World Bank study found 
that “[b]y 2025, the global crowdfunding market could reach between $90 
billion and $96 billion—roughly 1.8 times the size of the global venture 
capital industry today.”4 Crowdfunding in its various forms has taken the 
world by storm, and the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (“SEC”) 
recent enactment of Regulation A+ could open the floodgates even wider 
by enabling companies to conduct retail equity crowdfunding raises of up 
to $50 million at a time.5 
Whether equity crowdfunding holds the potential to spur economic 
development is still up for debate, but early signs have been promising. A 
study of Kickstarter campaigns found that “over 90% of successful 
projects remained as ongoing ventures for 1–4 years after their campaign, 
almost a third reported annual revenues of over $100,000 a year since the 
campaign, and successful projects increased their staffing by 2.2 
employees on average.”6 Another, more recent survey found that “[o]f the 
fifty highest funded projects on Kickstarter, . . . [forty-five] have turned 
                                                                                                                 
 1. MASSOLUTION, 2013CF THE CROWDFUNDING INDUSTRY REPORT (2013). This 
figure includes reward-based, donation-based, debt-based, and equity-based 
crowdfunding. 
 2. Michael S. Fischer, Crowdfunding Makes Rapid Gains with Accredited 
Investors, THINKADVISOR (Mar. 30, 2015), https://www.thinkadvisor.com/2015/03/30/ 
crowdfunding-makes-rapid-gains-with-accredited-inv [https://perma.cc/HKP7-2W6J]. 
 3. Zachary Zagger, Real Estate Crowdfunding to Top $2.5B in 2015, Report Says, 
LAW360 (Mar. 3, 2015, 10:00 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/624658/real-
estate-crowdfunding-to-top-2-5b-in-2015-report-says [https://perma.cc/J77G-7E6B]. 
 4. Katherine Noyes, Why Investors Are Pouring Millions into Crowdfunding, 
FORTUNE (Apr. 17, 2014, 6:47 PM), https://fortune.com/2014/04/17/why-investors-are-
pouring-millions-into-crowdfunding [https://perma.cc/3KY6-RWHG]. 
 5. See infra Section I.C. 
 6. Gary Bruton et al., New Financial Alternatives in Seeding Entrepreneurship: 
Microfinance, Crowdfunding, and Peer-to-Peer Innovations, 39 ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
THEORY & PRAC. 9, 15 (2015) (citing Mollick, After the Campaign: Outcomes of 
Crowdfunding (UNC Kenan-Flagler, Research Paper No. 2376997, 2014), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2376997 [https://perma.cc/Q4AN-BKT2]). 
158 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XXII 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
into ongoing entrepreneurial firms.”7 Thus, the early evidence seems to 
suggest that crowdfunding platforms are indeed capable of spawning 
viable businesses. Even more promising is a recent success story from the 
United Kingdom’s equity crowdfunding scene8: 
In October of 2012, a pharmaceutical development company called 
Antabio, which had raised early stage funding on WiSeed, became the 
first company to reach an important milestone in the development of 
equity crowdfunding—over two hundred crowd investors received a 
profitable return in an exit event. In fact, not only did the investors 
make a return, some made as much as 70% on their initial investment 
when a larger pharmaceutical development company bought out all of 
Antabio’s existing shares.9 
Current experience with crowdfunding indicates that those seeking funds 
are, for the most part, serious about what they are doing: roughly 25% of 
hardware projects on Kickstarter deliver on time, which is in line with the 
on-time performance rates of projects backed by more traditional funding 
sources.10 Experiments with allowing intrastate equity crowdfunding in 
several Midwestern states also seem to indicate that fraud is not 
rampant.11 
                                                                                                                 
 7. Ethan Mollick, Swept Away by the Crowd? Crowdfunding, Venture Capital, and 
the Selection of Entrepreneurs 10 (Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, 
Working Paper, 2013), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2239204 
[https://perma.cc/T5H9-REJU]. 
 8. Note that the United Kingdom’s market is a dramatically different market from 
that of the United States, and thus may not be a perfect indicator of how United States 
crowdfunding campaigns will fare. Note also that given the nascency of the 
crowdfunding market, one should be hesitant to generalize too readily from the small 
number of samples we have to work with at the current time. 
 9. Ross S. Weinstein, Crowdfunding in the U.S. and Abroad: What to Expect When 
You’re Expecting, 46 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 427, 446 (2013). 
 10. Can Crowdfunding Democratize Access to Capital?, INNOVATION@WORK BLOG 
(Jun. 2, 2014), https://executive.mit.edu/blog/can-crowdfunding-democratize-access-to-
capital [https://perma.cc/H3ND-BATC]. 
 11. Steven Davidoff Solomon, S.E.C.’s Delay on Crowdfunding May Just Save It, 
N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Nov. 18, 2014), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/11/18/s-e-
c-s-delay-on-crowdfunding-may-just-save-it-2/ [https://perma.cc/KX6M-43PP]. These 
early experiments are being somewhat contradicted by recent developments under the 
JOBS Act. See, e.g., Martin O’Sullivan, FINRA Bars Crowdfunding Portal in 1st JOBS 
Act Settlement, LAW360 (Dec. 9, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/870969/finra-
bars-crowdfunding-portal-in-1st-jobs-act-settlement [https://perma.cc/BV68-CCYT]. 
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With this in mind, many prominent voices have called for relaxed 
regulations on capital gathering by start-ups. Steve Case, for example, has 
famously called for giving unaccredited investors greater ability to invest 
by noting that “[i]t seems a little crazy to me that you have to be an 
accredited investor to invest in a company, but you can go to Las Vegas 
and lose $10,000 at the table in an hour and you don’t have to be an 
accredited gambler to do that.”12  Others note that regulators’ natural 
aversion to letting start-ups freely raise capital has often worked to the 
detriment of investors. Sam Guzik, an attorney practitioner who 
frequently writes on issues in this field, is fond of pointing out that the 
state of Massachusetts blocked its residents from participating in Apple’s 
1980 initial public offering (“IPO”) because the investment opportunity 
failed merit review, thereby preventing those residents from holding a 
piece of what later became the most valuable public company in the 
world.13 
But for all its promise, opening up the largely unexplored frontier of 
equity crowdfunding brings some massive risks. Several prominent 
commentators question whether the general public can properly vet 
investment opportunities and screen out fraudulent company listings,14 
and it is far from clear that unaccredited investors will be able to diversify 
sufficiently to avoid devastating losses. Despite these very real risks, 
Regulation A+ has been placed in the Code of Federal Regulations and is 
now in effect. This Article examines the potential consequences of its 
adoption, critiques the two primary rationales for the regulation in light 
of those consequences, and offers a normative framework that ought to 
guide the SEC’s enforcement going forward.15 Analysis will proceed in 
four parts. Part I discusses the history of and impetus for Regulation A+. 
Part II discusses the merits of the “democratizing access to capital” 
                                                                                                                 
 12. Scott Edward Walker, Crowdfunding Bill Stuck in the Senate, FORBES (Jan. 13, 
2012), https://www.forbes.com/sites/scottedwardwalker/2012/01/13/crowdfunding-bill-
stuck-in-the-senate/2 [https://perma.cc/6S6W-EA4H]. 
 13. Sam Guzik, Regulation A+ Offerings—A New Era at the SEC, HARV. L. SCH. F. 
ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 15, 2014), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/ 
2014/01/15/regulation-a-offerings-a-new-era-at-the-sec [https://perma.cc/5U8V-XPUJ]. 
 14. See, e.g., Thomas Lee Hazen, Crowdfunding or Fraudfunding? Social Networks 
and the Securities Laws—Why the Specially Tailored Exemption Must Be Conditioned 
on Meaningful Disclosure, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1735 (2012). 
 15. While the scope of this Article is limited to discussing Regulation A+, to the 
extent Regulation Crowdfunding (issued under Title III of the JOBS Act) has similar 
aims, the same critiques can be leveled against it and the same prescriptions apply. 
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rationale for Regulation A+. Part III examines the merits of the “IPO 
facilitation” rationale for Regulation A+. Part IV evaluates Regulation A+ 
holistically in light of its dual goals and makes certain suggestions in 
terms of enforcement. 
I. HISTORY AND IMPETUS FOR REGULATION A+ 
A. THE ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF SMALL FIRMS 
In 2011, at least three bills were introduced that sought to increase 
access to capital for entrepreneurs. 16  All three bills were motivated 
(ostensibly) by a desire to spur economic growth, and were influenced by 
the pervasive notion that start-ups hold the key to such growth.17 And 
indeed, there is ample evidence (approaching the problem from multiple 
perspectives) to support the idea that start-ups are key drivers of economic 
prosperity. 
Consider the issue of reducing unemployment. Despite their small 
size, new businesses are responsible for the bulk of job creation. 
According to a report by the Kauffman Foundation, “existing firms are 
net job destroyers, losing 1 million jobs net combined per year. By 
contrast, in their first year, new firms add an average of 3 million jobs.”18 
And this job creation seems to be subject to a multiplier effect: each new 
high-tech job is estimated to create 4.3 additional non-high-tech jobs in a 
given region.19 The employment boost provided by start-ups seems to be 
relatively resilient compared to other job sources: “during recessionary 
years, job creation at startups remains stable, while net job losses at 
                                                                                                                 
 16. Walker, supra note 12. 
 17. Id. 
 18. TIM KANE, EWING MARION KAUFFMAN FOUND., THE IMPORTANCE OF STARTUPS 
IN JOB CREATION AND JOB DESTRUCTION (2010), https://www.kauffman.org/what-we-
do/research/firm-formation-and-growth-series/the-importance-of-startups-in-job-creatio 
n-and-job-destruction [https://perma.cc/FLE3-3S9U]. 
 19. IAN HATHAWAY, Bay Area Council Econ. Inst., TECHNOLOGY WORKS: HIGH-
TECH EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES IN THE UNITED STATES (2012). See generally Enrico 
Moretti, Local Multipliers, 100 AM. ECON. REV: PAPERS & PROC. 1 (2010). For a similar 
analysis reaching similar results in Europe, see Marten Goos et al., High Technology 
Employment in the European Union (Vives, Discussion Paper, 2013), https://feb.kuleuv 
en.be/VIVES/Onderzoek/discussionpapers/DP/dp2013/final-20131223-3rd.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/96UV-EGWX]. 
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existing firms are highly sensitive to the business cycle.”20 Similarly, 
“[p]atterns of job growth at startups and existing firms are both pro-
cyclical, although existing firms have much more cyclical variance.”21 
New firms backed by venture capitalists are especially adept at 
producing jobs. In fact, in 2010, there were 11.9 million venture-backed 
jobs in the United States, comprising 11% of jobs in the private sector22—
this, despite annual venture capital investment amounting to less than 
0.2% of GDP.23 These jobs are also slightly more resilient than average: 
while the 2008 financial crisis caused a drop in private-sector 
employment of 2.6% from 2008 to 2010, “venture-backed company 
employment fell by only 2.0 percent—23 percent less than the overall 
decline.”24 Statistics on angel investments paint a similar picture: “by one 
estimate, in the first half of 2013 alone, angels invested approximately 
$9.7 billion in over 28,000 ventures, with over 111,000 new jobs created 
as a result of these investments.”25 
Interestingly, research suggests that “92% of job growth for young 
companies occurs after an initial public offering.” 26  The Kauffman 
Foundation estimates that if companies had gone public in the first decade 
of the twenty-first century at the same rate they did between 1980 and 
2000, an additional 1.881 million jobs would have been created over that 
                                                                                                                 
 20. KANE, supra note 18. 
 21. Id. 
 22. NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, VENTURE IMPACT: THE ECONOMIC 
IMPORTANCE OF VENTURE CAPITAL-BACKED COMPANIES TO THE U.S. ECONOMY 3 (6th 
ed. 2011), https://www.jumpstartnetwork.org/sitecore/content/jumpstartinc/home/results 
/dl/~/media/JumpStartInc/Images/Results-Page/2011-NVCA-VentureImpactReport.as 
hx [https://perma.cc/L3UT-HJUN]. 
 23. Id. at 2. 
 24. Id. at 8. 
 25. Keith Higgins, The Changing Regulatory Landscape for Angel Investing, HARV. 
L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Apr. 21, 2014), https://blogs.law.harvard. 
edu/corpgov/2014/04/21/the-changing-regulatory-landscape-for-angel-investing/ [https: 
//perma.cc/7JR2-FJR2] (citing JEFFREY SOHL, CTR. FOR VENTURE RESEARCH, THE 
ANGEL INVESTOR MARKET IN Q1Q2 2013: A SUSTAINABLE GROWTH CONTINUES (2013), 
https://paulcollege.unh.edu/sites/paulcollege.unh.edu/files/Q1Q2%202013%20Analysis
%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/4UKV-W3W4]). 
 26. NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, supra note 22, at 4. This figure is questioned 
in MARTIN KENNEY, DONALD PATTON & JAY R. RITTER, EWING MARION KAUFFMAN 
FOUND., POST-IPO EMPLOYMENT AND REVENUE GROWTH FOR U.S. IPOS, JUNE 1996-
2010 (2012), https://www.kauffman.org/what-we-do/research/2012/05/postipo-employ 
ment-and-revenue-growth-for-us-ipos-june-19962010 [https://perma.cc/DB69-NTGW], 
which considers the actual number to be something closer to 62%.  
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decade.27 Given those staggering figures, it is easy to understand why 
Congress and the SEC have made it a priority to create a smoother “on-
ramp” for emerging growth companies,28 attempting to offer start-ups a 
cheaper, easier “mini-IPO” under Regulation A.29 
GDP figures paint a similar picture regarding the importance of new 
firms. According to the National Venture Capital Association, “for every 
dollar of venture capital invested from 1970 to 2010, $6.27 of revenue 
was generated in 2010.”30 In fact, revenue from venture capital-backed 
companies currently comprises roughly 21% of U.S. GDP.31 Similarly, a 
report from Deutsche Bank finds that “[a]n increase in VC investments of 
0.1% of GDP is statistically associated with an increase in real GDP 
growth of .30pp. A similar increase in seed and startup investments is 
associated with an increase of as much as .96pp.”32 
On a more qualitative level, start-ups seem to improve the flow of 
tacit information among firms in a given region, thereby contributing 
greatly to a region’s competitiveness. 33  Small firms lead to more 
knowledge dissemination and thus are more impactful to the local 
economy, while “[l]arge firms incorporate many of the services within 
their own operations because they can achieve scale economies within the 
                                                                                                                 
 27. KENNEY ET AL., supra note 26. Query, however, whether the drop in IPOs has a 
direct causal effect on employment figures, or whether employment figures and IPO 
figures are both driven by some third, common cause. 
 28. See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, Title I, 126 Stat. 
306, 307-13 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (2012)). 
 29. See, e.g., Victoria Silchenko, Fifty Shades of White: Raising Equity from the 
Public by Start-ups, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 31, 2015), https://www.huffingtonpost.com 
/victoria-silchenko/fifty-shades-of-white-rai_b_6966268.html [https://perma.cc/88WN-
GEH5] (characterizing the regulation as creating a “mini-IPO” mechanism). 
 30. NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, supra note 22, at 2. 
 31. Id.  
 32. THOMAS MEYER, Deutsche Bank Research, VENTURE CAPITAL ADDS ECONOMIC 
SPICE 5 (2010), https://www.dbresearch.com/PROD/DBR_INTERNET_EN-PROD/PR 
OD0000000000262487.PDF [https://perma.cc/EHC4-FY8P]. The report cautions, 
however, that causality likely runs both ways. Id. at 5. The author does find that a 
Granger-causality test of the U.S. data indicated that U.S. venture capital investment 
does, in fact, cause real-GDP growth. Id. at 4. 
 33. Matthew A. Zook, The Knowledge Brokers: Venture Capitalists, Tacit 
Knowledge and Regional Development, 28 INT’L J. URB. & REGIONAL RES. 621, 624 
(2004)). 
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firm.”34 In other words, large firms are more fully integrated and less 
reliant on outside suppliers, such that “dollar for dollar, their business is 
less of a stimulus” because it generates less local knowledge 
dissemination than that of smaller firms.35 
Thus, it is clear that new firms are integral to the success of the U.S. 
economy, regardless of whether success is measured in terms of 
employment rate, GDP, or other less easily quantifiable measures, such 
as the rate of knowledge dissemination. 
B. REGULATION A AND ITS SHORTCOMINGS 
Regulation A+ updates Regulation A, an exemption that was meant 
to be attractive for small issuers. Compared to full SEC registration, the 
Regulation A exemption offered numerous benefits including (but not 
limited to) the following: 
(i) reduced disclosures to investors . . . including the ability to use 
“reviewed” financial statements instead of audited financial 
statements, . . . [(ii)] the ability to “test the waters” prior to incurring 
significant upfront costs such as filing an offering memorandum with 
the SEC, [(iii)] the ability of an investor to receive free trading shares 
upon their issuance, and (iv) the absence of post-offering reporting 
requirements unless and until a company meets the threshold reporting 
requirements applicable to all companies under the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934.36 
However, Regulation A proved to be highly unpopular. From 1997 to 
2011, the number of filings per year began at a mere 116 and fell to 19.37 
Actual use of the exemption is even lower; in fact, in 2011, only one of 
the nineteen filings ultimately resulted in an offering qualified by 
Regulation A.38 As a result, Regulation A filings are currently dwarfed by 
both Regulation D offerings (8194 in 2011) and registered IPOs (312 in 
2011).39 This low utilization is generally attributed to the high cost of 
                                                                                                                 
 34. Id. at 624 (citing Chinitz, Contrasts in Agglomeration: New York and Pittsburgh, 
51 AM. ECON. REV. 279, 288 (1961)). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Guzik, supra note 13. 
 37. U.S GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-839, SECURITIES REGULATION: 
FACTORS THAT MAY AFFECT TRENDS IN REGULATION A OFFERINGS 8-9 (2012). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 10-11. 
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conducting a Regulation A offering compared to the amount that can be 
raised.40 The bulk of the cost arises from the need to comply with blue sky 
laws of each state where the offering is conducted,41 which can require 
substantial time and money.42 The most troublesome blue sky laws are 
those involving “merit review,” 43  which can lead to incidents like 
Massachusetts’ infamous decision to pull the plug on Apple’s 1980 IPO. 
C. REGULATION A+ TO THE RESCUE 
Recognizing the failure of Regulation A to offer meaningful support 
to small issuers, Congress elected to update the regulation in Title IV of 
the JOBS Act. 44  This enhanced form of Regulation A is commonly 
referred to as “Regulation A+.” The SEC, working under the mandate of 
Congress, proposed rules for Regulation A+ on December 18, 2013.45 The 
final Regulation A+ rules were announced on March 25, 2015 with slight 
variations from their proposed form. Under the final rules, the exemption 
is available in two tiers, which work as follows: 
 The Tier 1 exemption is available only to those who raise $20 
million or less.46  It requires both SEC and state-level review, 
along with the associated fees.47 Issuers are, by default, required 
only to have their financials reviewed for registration, not audited, 
                                                                                                                 
 40. Guzik, supra note 13. 
 41. Id. (citing U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 37). 
 42. Id.; see also David Drake, Crowdfunding Industry Set to Explode as SEC 
Approves Regulation A+, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 27, 2015), https://www.huffington 
post.com/david-drake/crowdfunding-industry-set_b_6953600.html [https://perma.cc/3A 
5L-USWR]. 
 43. Guzik, supra note 13. 
 44. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, Title IV, 126 Stat. 
306, 323-25 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c-77d, 77r (2012)). 
 45. Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Proposed Rules to Increase Access 
to Capital for Smaller Companies (Dec. 18, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/News/PressRele 
ase/Detail/PressRelease/1370540518165 [https://perma.cc/QWQ3-RK25]. 
 46. David Drake, Why the New Regulation A+ Rules Will Rock the Crowdfunding 
World, HEDGECO.NET (Mar. 29, 2015), https://www.hedgeco.net/blogs/2015/03/29/why 
-the-new-regulation-a-rules-will-rock-the-crowdfunding-world-by-david-drake/ [https:// 
perma.cc/KH4N-6WLV]. 
 47. Id. 
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although audited financials are required to be disclosed if they are 
already in existence.48 
 The Tier 2 exemption, in contrast, is available for raises of up to 
$50 million.49 Tier 2 requires SEC review but no state blue-sky 
review, in essence pre-empting state-level review.50 Issuers must 
disclose audited financials51 and must submit to an annual audit 
on a going-forward basis. This exemption also requires the use of 
a registered transfer agent.52 
Both tiers create unrestricted securities, 53  allow participation by 
unaccredited investors, and are not available for certain “bad actors” or 
for reporting companies.54 In certain circumstances, Tier 2 offerings are 
exempt from the registration requirements of Section 12(g) of the 
Securities Exchange Act.55 
Practitioners have argued that compared to Rule 506(c) offerings,56 
Regulation A+ has both pros and cons that are, on balance, likely to make 
it a somewhat attractive option for issuers. On the plus side, Regulation 
A+ allows for solicitation of unaccredited investors, creates a tradable 
                                                                                                                 
 48. Id.; see also KATHERINE K. DELUCA ET AL., A GUIDE TO REGULATION A+ 11 
(2015), https://media.mcguirewoods.com/publications/2015/White-Paper-on-Regulation 
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 55. Dorothee Fisher-Appelt and Godric C. Shoesmith, Greenberg Traurig, LLP, SEC 
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 56. By way of background, Rule 506(c) is an exemption from the registration 
requirements of the Securities Act of 1933, which allows an issuer to engage in a general 
solicitation without having to register the securities being sold, so long as the issuer limits 
participation to accredited investors only and takes certain concrete steps to verify the 
accredited status of each participant. See generally U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Fast 
Answers: Rule 506 of Regulation D, SEC (Oct. 6, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/fast-
answers/answers-rule506htm.html [https://perma.cc/3U6G-AXDY]. Rule 506(c), unlike 
some of the other exemptions from the ’33 Act, does not place a limit on the size of the 
offering. Id. 
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security, and has relatively high offering limits (especially under Tier 2).57 
Its downsides include the considerable time it can take to launch a 
Regulation A+ offering (SEC review being a bottleneck) and the 
increased legal fees and accounting costs compared to Regulation D 
private placements (because of the fees associated with both the initial 
registration and the ongoing reporting obligations).58 
On its face, Regulation A+ promises to change the risk capital 
landscape in two ways: (1) by addressing inequitable distributions of risk 
capital, thereby “democratizing” access to capital, and (2) by creating a 
“mini-IPO” process less burdensome than full IPOs, thereby affording 
increased access to public markets for companies too small to afford the 
expense of the extensive registration and disclosure involved in 
conducting a full IPO. Viewed critically, however, both rationales contain 
serious flaws which largely undermine the arguments for adopting 
Regulation A+. The two rationales will be discussed in turn. 
II. THE “DEMOCRATIZING ACCESS TO CAPITAL” RATIONALE—DOES 
IT HOLD UP? 
A. IS THERE A GENERAL UNDERSUPPLY OF RISK CAPITAL? 
Many entrepreneurs will argue that a huge barrier to their success is 
the fact that too few investors are willing to invest in risky, early-stage 
ventures. For example, a 2014 survey found that the second most common 
perceived reason for failure among unsuccessful start-ups was that they 
“[r]an out of cash.”59 Similarly, there is no shortage of news articles from 
various regions claiming that a severe lack of capital in the area is holding 
back the local start-up community (and, by extension, the local 
economy).60 
                                                                                                                 
 57. Drake, supra note 46. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Erin Griffin, Why Startups Fail, According to Their Founders, FORTUNE (Sept. 
25, 2014, 3:00 PM), https://fortune.com/2014/09/25/why-startups-fail-according-to-their 
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 60. See, e.g., Chuck Soder, Local Startups Are Stalled by Lack of Capital, CRAIN’S 
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2017]      THE RIGHT DEED FOR THE WRONG REASON 167 
However, those on the other side of the table paint a very different 
picture. A common refrain among venture capitalists is that “[t]here’s still 
too much money . . . chasing too few deals.”61 The consensus seems to be 
that the existing private placement market is already a deep source of 
funding, and those entrepreneurs who feel that there is an undersupply of 
capital are probably overestimating the number of viable ventures. 62 
Venture capitalists also contend that while funding levels have remained 
relatively constant over time (albeit with some cyclical variance), the 
amount of capital needed to launch a company has decreased dramatically 
in recent years due to cloud computing, lower software development 
costs, and a variety of other advancements.63 
While the literature is somewhat conflicting, the bulk of the 
empirical evidence gathered so far seems to indicate that venture capital 
is not, in general, undersupplied. Perhaps the starkest indicator of this is 
the fact that venture capital returns during the 2000s were abysmal. If 
venture capital, as an asset class, were undersupplied, one would expect 
the “price” of acquiring venture capital to be artificially high and returns 
on venture capital investments to be artificially high as a result (on a risk-
adjusted basis). Yet an infamous Kauffman Foundation report from 2009 
suggests that, on average, venture capital funds failed to outperform the 
Russell 2000 Index from 1997 to 2009.64 In fact, more than half of the 
                                                                                                                 
 61. E.g., Carmel DeAmicis, Bill Draper: Why Venture Returns Have Fallen 
Dramatically and Will Likely Stay That Way, PANDODAILY (June 24, 2013), https://pando 
.com/2013/06/24/venture-capitalist-bill-draper-takes-the-long-view-of-history-2/ [https: 
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 63. See, e.g., Deborah Gage, Which Start-Ups Should Not Raise Venture Capital?, 
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software industry than other industries, but even for non-software companies a robust 
ecosystem has developed, which lowers costs appreciably. 
 64. DIANE MULCAHY ET AL., EWING MARION KAUFFMAN FOUND., WE HAVE MET 
THE ENEMY, AND HE IS US 3 (2012), https://www.kauffman.org/~/media/kauffman_org/ 
research%20reports%20and%20covers/2012/05/we_have_met_the_enemy_and_he_is_
us.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZB4A-HKQU]. 
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venture capital firms surveyed in the report failed to even return investor 
capital (after fees) during the period from 1989 to 2003—suggesting that, 
if anything, venture capital is probably being oversupplied at the moment, 
not undersupplied.65 
Evidence from European markets conflicts with this picture 
somewhat, but not entirely. A survey conducted of small enterprise 
financing data in the United Kingdom found that “small business growth 
is constrained by a lack of working capital,”66 even after controlling for a 
number of variables related to business and owner characteristics. 
Another study found that “European [technology companies] finance new 
investments by relying primarily on internal funds. There seems to be a 
wedge between the cost of internal and outside finance, including debt 
and external equity. Such a wedge is likely due to capital market failures 
induced by asymmetric information.”67 It is important to note, however, 
that two factors limit the applicability of these studies. First, the United 
Kingdom does not have as robust a private capital market as the United 
States, so one must be careful about generalizing too much from data from 
the United Kingdom. Second, given the evidence that the observed market 
failure is rooted in information asymmetry, the correct way to address it 
would be by facilitating quality disclosures, rather than trying to increase 
the supply of capital. 
In short, the evidence is not entirely consistent, but the most 
convincing signs indicate that there is probably not a nationwide—or 
global—shortage of startup capital. 
B. IS THERE A REGIONAL EQUITY GAP? 
Even if there is no nationwide undersupply of capital, it is possible 
that capital might be undersupplied in some regions and overabundant in 
others, creating a “regional equity gap” to the detriment of entrepreneurs 
in the underserved regions. Indeed, there is evidence that venture capital 
                                                                                                                 
 65. Id. at 4. 
 66. Stuart Fraser et al., What Do We Know About Entrepreneurial Finance and Its 
Relationship with Growth?, 33 INT’L SMALL BUS. J. 70, 78 (2015) (citing STUART 
FRASER, ACCESS TO FINANCE FOR CREATIVE INDUSTRY BUSINESSES (2011), https://www. 
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 67. Valérie Revest & Alessandro Sapio, Financing Technology-Based Small Firms 
in Europe: What Do We Know?, 39 SMALL BUS. ECON. 179, 198 (2012). 
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investments tend to flow disproportionately to a small number of tech 
“clusters.”68 If there is a regional equity gap, crowdfunding seems to hold 
great promise to remedy it, since “80% of [crowd]funding comes from 
people more than 3,000 miles away from the startup’s/fund seeker’s 
physical location.”69 But to understand whether there is a regional equity 
gap at all, we must first understand why venture capital investments are 
so heavily clustered. 
1. Venture Capitalist and Angel Investment Criteria 
Both venture capitalists and angel investors exhibit a tendency to 
invest disproportionately high amounts of capital in certain key regions.70 
A series of papers by Florida and Kenney in the early 1990s, for example, 
found that venture capital investments primarily flowed into established 
high-tech centers such as Silicon Valley and Boston’s Route 128.71 They 
further found that technology hubs attract venture capitalists not only 
from the surrounding, local regions, but also from financial centers like 
New York and Chicago.72 While it might be expected that the clustering 
of venture capital investment would decline over time, subsequent studies 
have found just the opposite.73 This effect has become so pronounced that 
today, despite talk of globalization, “the average distance between a lead 
VC and their investment is 70 miles.”74 This is very much a conscious 
decision on the part of investors—surveys find that somewhere between 
25% and 72% of angel investors will intentionally limit their investing to 
within fifty miles of home.75 
                                                                                                                 
 68. See, e.g., Richard L. Florida & Martin Kenney, Venture Capital, High-
Technology and Regional Development, 22 REGIONAL STUD. 33, 33 (1988). 
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 70. Richard Florida & Donald F. Smith, Jr., Venture Capital Formation, Investment, 
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 73. Colin Mason, VC: A Geographical Perspective, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON 
VENTURE CAPITAL 86, 102 (Hans Landstrom ed., 2007). 
 74. Olav Sorenson & Toby E. Stuart, Bringing the Context Back In: Settings and the 
Search for Syndicate Partners in Venture Capital Investment Networks, 53 ADMIN. SCI. 
Q. 266 (2008); Mollick, supra note 7, at 8 (citation omitted). 
 75. Mason, supra note 73, at 90–91 (citing PATRICK COVENEY & KARL MOORE, 
BUSINESS ANGELS: SECURING START-UP FINANCE (1997); ROBERT J. GASTON, FINDING 
PRIVATE VENTURE CAPITAL FOR YOUR FIRM: A COMPLETE GUIDE (1989); Stuart Paul et 
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One commonly cited reason for this is a practical one: investors 
prefer to invest in companies that are physically close so that they do not 
have to travel far to work with their portfolio companies. 76  Yet a 
preference for avoiding long travel surely does not tell the whole story. A 
study of Germany’s venture capital industry found that the distance of the 
portfolio company was only a minor consideration in deciding when to 
invest, and that the interviewed investors generally agreed that the acute 
undersupply of good deals required them to be relatively geography 
agnostic.77 
A more nuanced view suggests that this effect arises, in part, because 
of the “absence of publicly available information on new and young 
businesses.”78 This view posits that their “unproven business models, 
untested management teams, new technologies and inchoate markets” are 
all significant sources of risk and uncertainty for investors.79 Venture 
capitalists attempt to minimize this risk by sharing information with 
“other investors, consultants, accountants and a wide range of other 
actors”80 —but information sharing does not come easily. For proper 
information sharing, participants need mutual trust, which can only be 
established over time and through ongoing communication; thus, the 
“nature of this information flow tends to [be] personal and informal and 
                                                                                                                 
al., The Operation of the Informal Venture Capital Market in Scotland, 5 VENTURE CAP. 
313 (2003); Dominique M. Short & Allan L. Riding, Informal Investors in the Ottawa-
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supra. 
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 78. Mason, supra note 73, at 103. 
 79. Id. (citing Olav Sorenson & Toby E. Stuart, Syndication Networks and the 
Spatial Distribution of Venture Capital Investments, 106 AM. J. SOC. 1546 (2001)). 
 80. Id. 
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therefore hard to conduct over distance.”81 Sticking to local investments 
is thus one way venture capitalists can “reduce uncertainty, compensate 
for ambiguous information and thereby [minimize] risk.”82 
This reliance on personal and professional relationships continues 
throughout every stage of the investment—from the initial investment 
decisions to the post-investment monitoring stage. 83  Post-investment, 
venture capitalists monitor their portfolio companies by “taking a seat on 
the board of directors, setting goals and metrics for the companies to meet 
and . . . [providing] advice and mentoring.”84 In some cases, they may 
directly manage the company (e.g., if the business is led by a young 
scientist). 85  The proximity of the venture capitalist to the company 
influences the efficacy of these post-investment activities in three ways: 
(1) venture capitalists can work more closely with local companies, (2) 
venture capitalists can provide more relevant referrals and contacts to 
nearby companies, and (3) “unplanned encounters” and informal 
informational flow is stronger if the venture capitalist and company are 
physically closer.86 Thus, venture capitalists who take seriously the goal 
of maximizing investment returns will naturally prefer to invest in start-
ups that are closer to them. 
To be sure, there are likely some factors that encourage localized 
venture capital-funding and that are not associated with greater returns. 
For example, “behavioral reasons may also contribute to [investors’] 
preference for local investments because [local investments] can 
potentially allow them to maintain and strengthen local social and family 
ties more effectively than distant transactions.”87 To the extent that such 
considerations drive investment decisions, crowdfunding may be able to 
offer an improvement by routing money to the most meritorious 
companies, rather than to companies that happen to offer potential 
personal benefits for local venture capitalists. However, there is little 
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evidence to suggest that personal perquisites play anything more than a 
minor role in venture capitalists’ decision-making. 
The above should not be taken to mean that the supply of venture 
capital necessarily constrains the flow of venture capital. To the contrary, 
the supply of venture capital is more than capable of flowing to the best 
opportunities through the mechanism of investment syndication. As long 
as there is at least one investor geographically close to the opportunity 
and willing to serve as the “lead investor” (i.e., the investor responsible 
for monitoring the investment), other investors from distant locales can 
participate without losing the benefit of local monitoring and mentorship. 
This process of syndication has led to the somewhat paradoxical situation 
that “[o]n the one hand, VC is highly mobile and on the other, it is very 
concentrated”88: regardless of the source of the capital, investments tend 
to occur near “concentrations of high-technology businesses and 
employment and VC coinvestment.”89 Thus, the supply and demand of 
venture capital appear to be largely geographically decoupled, which 
“contradicts the underlying premise upon which much public policy in 
this area rests, viz., that ‘gaps’ in the [venture capital] supply are a major 
reason for the lack of high-technology development in certain places.”90 
In short, as long as a given market has enough local venture 
capitalists to enable a pipeline of incoming syndicated investments, policy 
makers should not worry about the absolute supply of local venture capital 
(in dollar terms). Accordingly, initiatives that attempt to spur local growth 
and development by providing funds for venture capital investment have 
historically been unsuccessful. Historical data from cities as varied as 
Silicon Valley, Ottawa, Washington, D.C., and Cambridge all indicate 
that “venture capital lags rather than leads the emergence of 
entrepreneurial activity.”91 In the case of Ottawa, “[a] survey of high tech 
start-ups founded since 1965 . . . found that few had raised external 
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finance, none had raised venture capital and the most important source of 
funding was the personal savings of their founders.”92 
Thus, it is far from clear that there is a true regional equity gap. The 
perceived regional gap is likely just a result of certain regions being better 
or worse for entrepreneurs. Pouring money into traditionally underserved 
regions may be a waste—especially if that money does not come with 
monitoring, mentorship, advice, new networks of contacts, and all the 
other myriad benefits that good venture capitalists offer. Section II.B.ii 
below provides further support for that reading of the data by examining 
various explanations for why Silicon Valley has outperformed other 
similar regions. 
2. Regional Differences that May Explain Venture Capital Clustering 
Given the theoretical potential for venture capital to flow to wherever 
it will earn the greatest returns, the obvious implication is that venture 
capital clustering occurs because certain regions simply offer better 
prospects for entrepreneurial ventures. And indeed, there is good 
evidence that this is the case. This section will explore that notion by first 
examining Silicon Valley as a region and then comparing it to other 
regions. 
The modern Silicon Valley emerged sometime in the second half of 
the twentieth century. In the view of Jerome Engel, “three components—
universities, government, and entrepreneurs—played key historic roles in 
the transformation of this small agricultural valley into the powerhouse of 
invention and business creation” that it is today. 93  For example, the 
Stanford Industrial Park (now Stanford Research Park), which was 
created in 1951 on university-owned land, now hosts more than 150 
companies with over 23,000 employees. 94  Government involvement 
began in earnest immediately prior to World War II and continued 
through the Cold War, with “military research fund[ing] engineering 
efforts in universities . . . , national government laboratories . . . , and 
private firms in Silicon Valley.”95 As one researcher notes, “[t]his long-
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term governmental spending on military weapons and aerospace R&D in 
the Valley can be considered as a crucial catalyst for the subsequent 
emergence of this techno-centric innovation cluster.”96 
Silicon Valley also houses a uniquely robust class of “professional 
entrepreneurs,”97 which some speculate has its origins in the California 
Gold Rush.98 Regardless of the origin of the class, it is clear that those 
professionals are now “core actors that drive Silicon Valley’s continuous 
self-reinvention with new industries and technologies.”99 
In terms of concrete resources, Silicon Valley has numerous venture 
capital funds, mature corporations (i.e., potential partners), industrial 
research centers, and professional service providers (including lawyers, 
accountants, design professionals, recruiting firms, investment bankers, 
incubators, and accelerators) “who not only provide[] tailored 
professional services, but also are willing to discount or defer fees, often 
in exchange for a small share in the venture’s eventual returns.”100 On a 
more qualitative level, Silicon Valley has mobility of resources, respect 
for entrepreneurial process, global strategic perspective, and an alignment 
of interests that permits companies to incentivize employees properly and 
allows innovators to collaborate with establishments together in a “win-
win challenge to displace incumbents.” 101  Finally, a comparison of 
Silicon Valley with other regions suggests that yet another key 
differentiator is Silicon Valley’s large talent pool and high labor 
velocity.102 
In contrast to those in Silicon Valley, small firms in peripheral areas 
are characterized by lower levels of innovation.103 Within those regions, 
the level of innovation is closely related to “the degree to which firms are 
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tied to local networks of suppliers and to external markets.”104 These 
regions are generally poor environments for entrepreneurship because 
they lack a critical mass of entrepreneurs. Without this critical mass, 
innovators have fewer role models and must rely on “nonlocal sources of 
information and technology,” which leads to less meaningful business 
relationships.105 The lack of successful role models can, in particular, 
cause small firms to have “weak market and product development, a 
particular problem of older industrial regions such as Pittsburgh.” 106 
Similarly, since “[e]ducation levels appear strongly related to 
entrepreneurial success and [are] associated with a greater range of 
information sources and a wider set of customers and markets,”107 regions 
that do not contain top-flight universities are at a natural disadvantage 
compared to those that do. 
Although a good location can certainly help, ultimately the success 
or failure of a given enterprise is determined not by its location, but by 
how well it is run. In the words of Edward Malecki, “[c]apital is actually 
less critical to small business success than simpler, but less easily 
supplied, inputs. Capital is secondary to information, business 
knowledge, and management expertise.”108 Thus, every region has the 
potential to be a Silicon Valley; what is required to achieve that potential 
is not a large stable of local venture capitalists but rather a thriving local 
economy with rapid information transfer between firms, receptiveness to 
innovation, and a labor pool of talented managers. 
3. What the Lack of a Regional Equity Gap Means for Regulation A+ 
Two interviews with prominent venture capitalists succinctly 
summarize the reasons why venture capital flows primarily to a small 
number of locales. As one notes: 
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[a]ll other things being equal, you want your venture capital to be 
local. I can see it in my own work. I sit on the boards of two companies 
in Virginia and four in California and the California firms see me ten 
times more [than] the ones in Virginia. Whether it is just stopping by, 
or brain-storming around a specific problem, they just get a lot more 
of my attention because they’re right here. And entrepreneurs do get 
it. If they are trying to build a successful company they know VCs can 
help. We’re a sounding board, market research company, headhunter, 
and we can connect them up with partners and suppliers. Plus, since 
we review so many business plans in the course of our work and know 
so many people in the business, we know what the larger movements 
in the market are.109 
Rounding out that point is this summary from the second interviewee: 
“[w]hat we’re really selling is time. When you have a start-up, time is 
your most precious commodity so you want to do anything that saves 
it.”110 In an environment where droves of companies are all competing to 
“quickly establish dominant brands and market share” (often in nascent, 
rapidly changing markets), it is only natural for entrepreneurial firms to 
cluster around the richest sources of funding and assistance, in order to 
access that funding and assistance as rapidly, efficiently, and 
continuously as possible.111 Both venture capitalists and entrepreneurs 
benefit from being physically located at the center of a system of tacit 
knowledge—it provides them with a great deal of know-how and “know-
who” (i.e., contacts) that they otherwise would not have access to.112 
Given this reality, simply throwing money at the problem will not 
work. To the extent that Regulation A+ is an attempt to empower 
communities currently underserved by venture capital firms by flooding 
them with a new supply of capital, the results are likely to be lackluster. 
It is not money itself that leads to prosperous ventures, but rather the 
mentorship, monitoring, and connections that come with that money—
benefits that unaccredited investors are generally unable to provide. This 
intuition was borne out in the early twenty-first century in experiments 
conducted in the United Kingdom, which were intended to reduce a 
perceived regional equity gap. The Hunter Center for Entrepreneurship in 
Glasgow found that despite significant government efforts to increase the 
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supply of capital and reduce the perceived equity gap, the gap between 
London and other regions of the United Kingdom has not been reduced 
significantly and may have actually widened in the years after 2001.113 In 
the United States, the experience of state-run venture capital funds in the 
1980s tells a similar story. As one industry observer put it, 
[d]uring the ’80s state governments got into venture capital as part of 
a failed strategy to develop high-technology enclaves. Within a few 
years those states saw most of their locally subsidized venture capital 
get exported to Silicon Valley, Route 128, or other places with 
promising high-tech start-ups; either that, or they saw their money go 
to local companies that failed to generate any profits. Now many of 
the states are reducing their commitment to venture capital or are 
pulling out altogether.114 
These failed attempts to remedy perceived regional equity gaps suggest 
that the underlying problem is not a lack of capital but rather a lack of 
talented entrepreneurs with the skills and knowledge needed to 
commercialize technological breakthroughs. Entrepreneurial expertise is 
hard to come by, and artificially inflating the supply of capital alone is 
unlikely to change that. 
This sentiment is echoed in the Kauffman Foundation’s educational 
policy briefs, which encourage state and local governments to focus on 
efforts to facilitate knowledge transfer rather than attempting to increase 
the supply of capital115: “there must be a long-term focus on entrepreneurs 
as individuals distinct from small businesses, who learn by doing and 
interacting with others. These connections are locally embedded even if 
entrepreneurs reach broad markets. The entrepreneurial experience is 
personal, and it is local.”116 In short, the Foundation suggests cultivating 
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networks and providing emotional support for entrepreneurs. The 
Foundation discourages public investment funds, and for those states 
where a public fund already exists, it suggests awarding many small 
prizes rather than a single large one in order to create a large cohort of 
entrepreneurs who can learn from each other.117 The Foundation prefers 
other, more effective policy measures though, such as relaxing 
professional licensing requirements, welcoming immigrants, streamlining 
tax codes and payment systems, and ending the enforcement of non-
compete agreements.118 
The Kauffman Foundation likely understates the appeal of public 
investing for a couple of important reasons. First, private investors (absent 
government intervention) generally conduct less research and 
development than would be socially optimal because they are unable to 
financially capture the social benefits of their research.119 Once social 
impacts are taken into consideration, by some estimates, “the social rate 
of return [to research and development] is between 150 and 200% of the 
private rate of return; according to that, government’s intervention is 
justified by means of market failure theories in order to . . . achieve a 
socially optimal situation.”120 Second, while bureaucrats generally cannot 
be trusted to “pick winners” when it comes to individual companies, 
expert agencies such as the Department of Defense or the National 
Institutes of Health have a fairly impressive track record of backing 
technologies that have ultimately become world-changing.121 So there is 
certainly solid theoretical foundation for using government funds to 
encourage early-stage research, and some support for the idea of using 
public funds to encourage socially beneficial ventures—although there is 
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no doubt that when it comes to providing funds to companies hoping to 
commercialize already extant technology, private investment firms have 
shown themselves to be much more adept than their government 
counterparts.122 
To the extent that crowdfunding participants play a role similar to 
that of public investors and solely provide money without performing any 
monitoring or advising, one can expect their investments to produce 
relatively lackluster results. Thus, the “opening the floodgates” aspect of 
Regulation A+ is unlikely to have a significant positive effect on the 
vitality of early-stage companies. There are unique benefits that come 
from taking “smart money,” and those benefits are not unlocked solely by 
enabling startups to look to the public for funding. 
C. SOCIAL REASONS TO ENCOURAGE CROWDFUNDING 
1. Gender/Race Issues 
While there is little evidence of an overarching need for more capital 
(either locally or nationally), there may still be some other, more 
pernicious systematic failings of the venture capital industry that are in 
need of remedy. For example, it is well known that women receive less 
venture capital funding than men: “less than 6% of venture capital funding 
has historically gone to companies with female CEOs, and only 1.3% of 
VC-backed companies have female founders.” 123  Minority-founded 
companies also receive disproportionately low amounts of venture capital 
funding.124 A recent Pepperdine University study confirms this disparity, 
finding that “[m]inority-, female- and foreign-owned companies are 
22.2%, 18.7% and 17.9% less likely [respectively] to successfully raise a 
venture round than companies run by American-born white males.”125 
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Many believe that these shocking numbers are attributable to the low 
number of female and minority investors at major venture capital funds 
(which is borne out in the data—a 2011 survey found, for example, that 
89% of venture capital partners were male and 76% were white males).126 
In light of these disparities, there is a strong case to be made that “gender 
and geographic biases . . . distort VC assessments.”127 
If this disparity in funding stems not from economically rational 
factors but rather from biases against women and minorities, we might 
expect market forces to remedy the problem, since those spurned 
businesses represent untapped opportunities and potential above-market 
returns. And indeed, several venture capital funds targeting female-
founded companies have cropped up in recent years,128 such as Isabella 
Capital, 129  Women’s Venture Capital Fund, 130  Texas Women’s 
Ventures, 131  Cowboy Ventures, 132  Aspect Ventures, 133  Broadway 
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Angels,134 Illuminate Ventures,135 Forerunner Ventures,136 and Aligned 
Partners,137 to name a few. Minority-focused funds are harder to find, but 
a few do exist.138 As promising as these funds are, the fact that they have 
begun to crop up only recently despite the funding disparities having 
existed for decades suggests that there are significant barriers to 
remedying this problem. 
To the extent that this is an issue, equity crowdfunding might help to 
eliminate the disparity and address the market failure. If equity 
crowdfunding allows entrepreneurs to appeal to a wider, more diverse set 
of investors, it might alleviate this bias and help ensure that female- and 
minority-led startups are not underserved by capital markets. At least one 
study of traditional (non-equity) crowdfunding has found that 
“entrepreneurial quality is assessed in similar ways by both VCs and 
crowdfunders, but . . . crowdfunding alleviates some of the geographic 
and gender biases associated with the way that VCs look for signals of 
quality.”139 The study found weak evidence that crowdfunders exhibit less 
geographic bias than venture capitalists and strong evidence that 
crowdfunders exhibit less gender bias than venture capitalists.140 Notably, 
while only 1.3% of venture capital-backed companies have female 
founders, over 21.1% of venture capital-eligible crowdfunded projects 
studied had female founders.141 Yet broadly, the same signals used by 
venture capitalists to assess viability of new ventures (e.g., past success, 
third-party endorsements, preparedness, etc.) were also used by 
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crowdfunders, suggesting that the crowdfunders are making rational 
investment decisions.142 
However, crowdfunding is not panacea here; crowdfunders are likely 
to be biased too, only in a different manner. Crowdfunding projects tend 
to pick up steam with time since people prefer to invest in projects that 
have already received significant funding.143 Friends and family are likely 
to be the first investors in a crowdfunding project, so “[t]o the extent that 
distant investors disproportionately rely on information revealed in the 
investment decisions of others, friends and family might play an 
important role in making early investments that generate that 
information.”144 The upshot is that those with the largest and wealthiest 
network of friends and family might achieve disproportionate success, 
regardless of the actual merits of their projects.145 In other words, while 
advances in technology in theory enable all modern-day entrepreneurs to 
draw from the same global pool of capital, in practice that pool of capital 
may only be accessible to those with a “sufficient base of offline 
support.”146 
2. Community Building 
Another social reason to welcome equity crowdfunding is its 
potential for community building. Consider the example of a community 
that uses crowdfunding to revitalize its downtown area—perhaps by 
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creating a public park or funding an “open lab.”147 Crowdfunding could 
be a way for the community to both finance projects and gauge their 
demand, while simultaneously getting “buy-in” from the community 
(thereby increasing the chances that the users of the project are “sticky” 
and highly engaged). If done correctly, equity crowdfunding could usher 
a new era in local governance, empowering citizens to more directly 
participate in the selection of public projects and assessment of local 
expenditures. Of course, this goal could likely be served by purely 
intrastate equity raises, so Regulation A+ does more than needed to secure 
this benefit. But to the extent Regulation A+ facilitates such raises, it 
constitutes a laudable advance. 
D. FINAL REMARKS ON “DEMOCRATIZING ACCESS TO CAPITAL” 
RATIONALE 
In short, although Regulation A+ seems poised to address inequities 
faced by female and minority entrepreneurs and also to facilitate 
community projects, it offers limited promise of democratizing access to 
early-stage capital in a way that spurs major economic development. This 
would not be worrisome if the weak economics of the “democratizing 
access to capital” rationale for the regulation were complemented by a 
strong IPO facilitation rationale. Unfortunately, upon close scrutiny, the 
IPO facilitation rationale appears to be highly tenuous as well. 
III. EXAMINING THE IPO FACILITATION RATIONALE 
A. THE NEED FOR IPOS 
It is well known that IPOs are “broken,” and have been for some 
time. As Steven Davidoff puts it, “[t]he small company initial public 
offering (IPO) is dead. In 1997, there were 168 exchange-listed IPOs for 
companies with an initial market capitalization of less than $75 million. 
In 2012, there were seven such IPOs, the same number as in 2003.”148 The 
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average time to IPO statistics tell a similar story: in 2000, the average age 
of a company at its IPO was ten years; in 2005, it was twenty-one.149 
Multiple explanations for the decline have been put forth, perhaps 
the most popular being that “increased federal regulation and market 
structure changes also driven by federal regulation” led to the falling 
number of IPOs. 150  Whatever the cause, the decline is particularly 
worrisome for venture capitalists, since they are highly dependent on 
IPOs as a source of “exit” that allows them to cash out. However, the lack 
of IPOs is problematic for consumers and the general public as well, since 
there is empirical evidence that IPOs are good for the consumer, given 
that (1) they herald “an era of reduced profits and greater consumer 
mobility within an industry,”151 and (2) most of the employment produced 
by new companies comes after the IPO stage.152 In fact, by one estimate, 
“[u]p to 22 million jobs may have been lost because of our broken IPO 
market.”153 Thus, Andrew W. Lo (the director of the MIT Laboratory for 
Financial Engineering) was right to state that “[w]e should be very 
concerned about this trend . . . . Capital markets are central to business 
formation and economic growth, and if [public] listings are falling, that is 
a sign there is not the same level of capital formation as there was in the 
past.”154 
Regulation A+, along with other provisions of the JOBS Act, 
promises to address this problem by lowering the regulatory hurdles 
involved in achieving liquidity for early-stage investors. In addition to 
providing liquidity for early investors, the mini-IPO market will offer 
businesses “many of the traditional benefits of the public offering process, 
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including improved valuations relative to traditional private offerings 
(due to the unrestricted nature of the securities) with scaled down 
regulatory costs.” 155  This cost reduction can be easily quantified: 
traditional IPO registration takes 1200 hours156 and can cost hundreds of 
thousands of dollars.157 The SEC estimates that a Regulation A+ Tier 2 
registration will cost $75,000,158 with some industry experts predicting 
that this price will come down even further as practitioners adjust to 
market needs (possibly by accepting equity as payment in lieu of cash).159 
The annual reports required by Regulation A+ will take another 600 hours 
and are estimated by the SEC to cost $60,000 a year.160 In contrast, the 
annual cost of being a public company is estimated by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers to be upwards of $1.5 million a year.161 
Yet not all are convinced that Regulation A+ will have the promised 
effect. For example, certain prominent Silicon Valley lawyers have gone 
on record stating that the effects of the new rules will be negligible for 
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technology firms, especially those in Silicon Valley. 162  Among other 
things, these experts question the “value of a mini-IPO market relative to 
the existing private placement market, which is already a deep source of 
funding that is unrestrained by the disclosure, audit and filing 
requirements that will accompany Regulation A+ capital.”163 Similarly, 
there is good reason to suggest that the root cause of the recent downtick 
in IPO frequency is not regulation but rather decreased investor demand 
for these securities. This section will address the controversy and 
ultimately conclude that Regulation A+ will do little to fix the IPO 
market. 
B. SMALL COMPANY IPOS—DEAD FOR GOOD REASON? 
A popular argument is that the decrease in IPOs can be traced to 
increased regulation of public companies, with the enactment of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”) often singled out as the main 
culprit. 164  In support of this argument, many point to the increase in 
listings in other, less-regulated countries since the passage of SOX in the 
United States.165 And indeed, studies show that after the passage of Title 
I of the JOBS Act, the value of public companies eligible for “Emerging 
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Growth Company” status (and the commensurate reduced regulatory 
compliance costs) jumped nearly 3.6%, suggesting that domestic public 
company regulations exact a very real (and quantifiable) cost.166 But there 
is good reason to think that the cost of regulatory compliance is only a 
small part of the reason for the downswing in IPO activity. A new 
consensus appears to be emerging that the decline in IPOs is attributable 
to market factors rather than regulatory changes. 
For example, a 2014 study by Steven Davidoff found as follows: 
the evidence derived from the lifecycle of small IPOs points to supply 
side changes, rather than regulatory changes, as the reason for the 
vanished small IPO. In short, we believe that investors simply tired of 
investing in these small IPOs due to their inability to survive and grow 
in the public markets. In the absence of investor demand, supply side 
forces [initially] still pushed these IPOs into the market . . . [but] have 
[now] disappeared in light of technological and market structure 
changes.167 
In that same study, Davidoff found that the enactment of the JOBS Act 
had little to no effect on small-company IPOs.168 Ultimately, Davidoff 
suggests that relaxing IPO regulations “may only bring back companies 
that are ill-suited to the public markets.”169 
This is consonant with the picture painted by David Weild, former 
Vice Chairman of NASDAQ. He argues that large brokerage firms have 
lower profitability as a result of advancements in technology and changes 
in regulation that increased competition and lowered trading costs.170 As 
a result, such firms have shifted their focus from smaller companies’ 
stocks to those of larger companies.171 He sees this as a cause for alarm: 
“[t]he whole ecosystem to support small-cap companies has shrunk . . . . 
This infrastructure is every bit as important as bridges, roads and tunnels. 
Without it, you undermine growth.”172 
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Another recent paper makes similar findings, arguing that (in 
essence) “firms are being acquired rather than going public because in 
many industries a small firm is worth more as part of a larger organization 
than as an independent firm, whether it is public or private.”173 In other 
words, the decrease in small company IPOs can be attributed to the 
perception that most companies would fetch a lower valuation in a public 
offering than they would in the context of a trade sale. 174  Crucially, 
though, the authors find that these depressed public market prices are not 
due to lack of analyst coverage or increased regulatory costs.175 Rather, 
they find that trade sales offer better valuations simply because “earnings 
are higher as part of a larger organization,” generally because of 
economies of scope that allow larger companies to “speed new 
technologies to market.”176 They conclude that “regulatory reforms aimed 
at restoring the IPO ‘ecosystem’ will have only a modest ability to affect 
IPO volume.”177 In sum, “while SOX . . . may have had some effect on 
small company IPOs, the more fundamental problems are the lack of 
profitable small company IPOs and the lack of small company IPOs that 
grow and become highly profitable, earning high returns for investors.”178 
Thus, there is ample reason to think a relaxed IPO regulatory regime 
(i.e., the provision of “mini-IPOs”) will do little to stimulate the anemic 
IPO market.  
IV. POTENTIAL PITFALLS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR ENFORCEMENT 
The benefits of Regulation A+ are expected to be modest and largely 
hard to quantify. With that in mind, for the regulation to be a sensible 
measure, it must not increase harm to investors appreciably. 
Unfortunately, there are myriad ways in which Regulation A+ in its 
current form might expose investors to new harms, the most salient of 
which are discussed below, along with some suggestions for reform. 
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A. POTENTIAL PITFALLS 
1. Behavioral Economics 
Humans exhibit a systematic bias towards overvaluing long-shot 
bets, due to the so called “optimism bias.”179 This effect likely stems from 
irrationalities regarding the extent of human involvement in 
fundamentally uncertain activities: “we act as though we can control 
purely random events like lotteries and dice rolls when[ever] there is a 
veneer—no matter how thin—of individual action involved.”180 Given the 
boom-or-bust nature of early-stage investing, equity crowdfunding is 
uniquely poised to activate this bias, to ill effect. 
To illustrate the potential magnitude of the problem, consider that 
the average American family has $3800 in savings. 181  Each year, 
Regulation A+ allows that family to risk up to 10% of its net worth or 
10% of its income—whichever is higher—on Tier 2 equity crowdfunding 
raises.182  Given that the median U.S. household income was roughly 
$54,000 in 2014,183 in practice, this means the average American family 
has the potential to wipe out the entirety of its savings by participating in 
Regulation A+ offerings in any given year. Based on data predating the 
adoption of Regulation A+, even among angel investors—a sophisticated 
group of investors who are able to carefully vet each investment—over 
half of the individual investments made result in a loss.184 The top 10% of 
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the investors take home 50% of the total gains, with a mere 10% of the 
investments garnering 75% of the total returns.185 If this distribution holds 
true in the crowdfunding context, then there will be a small number of 
investors with huge wins and a much larger number that experience losses 
they are ill-equipped to bear. 186  When combined with the human 
propensity to overvalue long-shot bets referenced above, the results could 
be devastating. 
2. The Lemons Problem 
One lesser concern is that if equity crowdfunding is perceived by 
entrepreneurs as a funding-route-of-last-resort, then the companies 
engaging in crowdfunding will generally be those with low potential for 
success, and those who invest in such companies will be “virtually certain 
to lose their money.”187 While the prospect of losing money is not foreign 
to early-stage investors, in this context it could be disastrous because, as 
Michael Dorff describes, 
the losses most issuers inflict will not be offset by a few huge winners. 
Investors will not find tomorrow’s Googles on crowdfunding portals 
because they will not be there; instead, start-ups with real potential 
will continue to use other programs, such as the newly expanded Rule 
506 exemption. This outcome is the inevitable result of the nature of 
start-up investing and crowdfunding.188 
Rory Eakin, Chief Operating Officer of the crowdfunding platform 
CircleUp, makes a similar prediction: “[i]f issuers can fundraise using 
Regulation D—no blue sky, audited financial, or ongoing reporting 
requirements—why will they raise under Reg A+? Similar to Title III, I 
only see Reg A+ working in edge cases.”189 
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While only time will tell if these predictions have merit, there are at 
least some reasons to think legitimate start-ups might prefer retail 
crowdfunding instead. For example, worthwhile start-ups might be drawn 
to retail crowdfunding over other options (such as venture capital) 
because retail crowdfunding might offer more attractive valuations and 
less intrusive investors. Similarly, retail crowdfunding might be a better 
source of funding for companies with long, slow growth trajectories that 
have been traditionally spurned by venture capitalists seeking rapid exits. 
In addition, private financings done under Regulation D generally 
produce restricted shares 190  subject to a “liquidity discount” which 
constrains the company’s valuation;191 Regulation A+ shares are freely 
tradable,192 which should result in higher valuations. Finally, consumer-
facing companies might prefer crowdfunding for the increased visibility 
it brings and its capacity for creating a built-in class of brand/product 
evangelists. In all likelihood, retail crowdfunding probably will not attract 
the most pedigreed of high growth companies, but that does not mean it 
does not have an important role to play in the early-stage capital 
ecosystem. 
3. Dilution 
The problem of dilution, wherein a founder or a seed-level investor 
sees his equity stake in the company—and thus the value of his 
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investment—drastically reduced in later rounds of financing, is a very real 
issue for early-stage startup participants. This problem has historically 
been a big concern with the CROWDFUND Act,193 and it applies with 
equal force in the Regulation A+ context.194 The concern is so prominent 
that one United Kingdom equity crowdfunding site, Crowdcube, 
explicitly mentions dilution in the investment disclaimer on its 
homepage.195 While dilution is a concern for any investor, this concern is 
particularly dangerous for crowdfunding investors given that (1) they 
generally lack the expertise needed to recognize this as a risk and 
negotiate contractual provisions protecting against it, and (2) even 
crowdfunders savvy enough to know this is a risk still face a “collective 
action problem” in that if the pool of investors is massive and widely 
dispersed (with each individual contributing only a small slice of the 
overall investment), then no one individual has a proper economic 
incentive to expend significant time and effort negotiating specific 
contractual protections against dilution (or enforcing those protections 
post-investment). 
One way to address this risk would be for the SEC to require that all 
shares distributed in Regulation A+ raises include certain anti-dilution 
provisions. However, this would probably be an unnecessary overreach 
and further deter businesses from raising capital via Regulation A+. At 
most, the SEC should require prominent disclosure of the anti-dilution 
protections attached to the shares being offered (if any). It is likely that 
with adequate disclosure and anti-fraud protection (backstopped by the 
limitations imposed by fiduciary duty law), the market will determine the 
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proper level of anti-dilution protection on its own (especially if the 
collective action problem is addressed through the encouragement of 
syndication, as discussed in Section IV.B.4 below). 
4. Fraud 
Perhaps the most widely discussed risk of allowing general 
solicitation is the risk of fraud, which reared its head once already in 
recent memory in the context of Rule 504.196 The episode in question 
began in 1992, when the SEC amended Rule 504 so that it no longer 
banned general solicitations.197 At the time, it was thought that for such 
small offerings, a hands-off approach was justified and state securities 
regulators could be relied upon to prevent fraud;198 however, this reliance 
proved to be misplaced. Almost immediately after the rule was amended, 
many issuers and traders began using the exemption to sell and trade 
worthless securities in microcap “pump-and-dump” schemes, often over 
the (then-new) internet.199 The incidence of fraud was so widespread that 
the SEC ultimately opted to amend Rule 504 to ban general 
solicitations.200 While fraud in the Regulation A+ context will likely take 
a different form, this historical vignette illustrates the ingenuity and 
prevalence of unscrupulous securities market participants. Early signs 
seem to indicate that outright fraud is not rampant in the crowdfunding 
space,201 but this will have to be closely policed going forward. 
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5. Decreased Protection from State Regulators 
An additional concern specific to the Tier 2 exemption under 
Regulation A+ is that by preempting state securities regulators, the 
regulation removes one of the traditional sources of protection for 
investors and thus puts them in harm’s way. State regulators, in contrast 
to the SEC, “are closer, more accessible, and more in touch with the local 
and regional economic issues,” making them (in theory) well suited to 
referee small, local securities transactions. 202  This unique position 
explains why “states have historically been the primary ‘cops on the beat’ 
in the regulation of all areas of small business capital formation.”203 
Despite the historical prominence of state securities regulators, in practice 
they have proven to be significantly less active than the SEC in 
commenting on filings, and even in cases when they do take action, their 
record is far from perfect (as alluded to in the Introduction above).204 To 
the extent state regulators are doing more harm than good, this particular 
concern with Regulation A+ may be unfounded, and pre-emption may 
well be a sensible policy. 
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6. The Risks of Distant Ownership 
One final concern is that enabling general solicitation encourages 
distant ownership, which is harmful in and of itself. There is research 
indicating that firms with a higher degree of local ownership are “more 
profitable and have more independent boards,”205 and are less likely to be 
named in class action lawsuits than their distantly owned counterparts.206 
The theoretical underpinning of this effect is that managers of firms with 
more local ownership are subject to more close and meaningful 
monitoring, making them less likely to engage in various undesirable (and 
unprofitable) activities such as “empire building,”207 “leading the quiet 
life,”208  aggressively managing earnings,209  and backdating options.210 
This close monitoring often takes the form of shareholders that are “more 
likely to introduce shareholder proposals, increase CEO turnover, and 
reduce excess CEO compensation” 211 —in effect, putting direct and 
continuous pressure on the company’s management to perform. The 
implication, of course, is that to the extent that Regulation A+ facilitates 
the raising of money from distant, widely dispersed investors, we can 
expect an increase in empire building and other undesirable corporate 
activities. 
B. SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM 
Given these issues, Regulation A+ could be improved in a number 
of ways. Four of the most pressing needs are addressed below. 
1. Anti-fraud Measures 
Fraud must be closely policed. Regulation A+ exposes an 
unsophisticated class of investors to an entirely new asset class. Given the 
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collective action problem involved in monitoring a retail crowdfunded 
investment coupled with the relative lack of sophistication of retail 
crowdfunding investors, the potential for fraud here is enormous. And 
indeed, our brief experiment with allowing general solicitation under Rule 
504 in the 1990s confirmed that there is no shortage of fraudsters willing 
to sell sham securities to the public.212 
To combat this, the SEC might consider heightened antifraud 
liability in this context, perhaps in the form of treble damages or strict 
liability. Of course, this is a bit of a balancing act—too much liability will 
result in no one using this financing mechanism, but too little liability will 
allow fraudsters to run free. The bad actor provisions that have been 
included in the rules213 should also help to guard against fraud. These, 
coupled with fiduciary duty law, should go a long way towards 
discouraging fraudsters from making use of Regulation A+ for their 
deviant schemes. 
Another novel technique that may help is the use of a “public 
shaming service”—i.e., a publicly available central database of bad actors 
maintained by the SEC. This database could include additional 
information such as the type of company the bad actor was pitching, the 
crowdfunding platform the bad actor used, etc. This measure would have 
the dual benefits of alerting investors to trends in fraudulent activity and 
of pressuring crowdfunding platforms into self-policing for fraud. 
Interestingly, private services providing a similar function have cropped 
up already;214 given their existence, it would be wise for the SEC to work 
with these services and to adjust disclosure requirements to aid them in 
their efforts. 
2. Diversification 
Investors must be encouraged to diversify appreciably. It has been 
shown that U.S. investors already hold under-diversified portfolios and 
are especially likely to under-diversify if they are young, low-income, less 
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educated, or less sophisticated.215 Diversification is likely to be a problem 
in the crowdfunding context because the relatively small annual caps on 
investments contained in Regulation A+ could easily push unaccredited 
investors into preferring to place one large bet over multiple small bets. 
Given how time consuming it is to vet an early-stage investment and how 
little money will be at play (generally), it will be far too tempting for the 
average investor to place all his eggs in one basket rather than exerting 
the immense time and effort it would take to build up a diversified 
portfolio. 
Two solutions might help. First, investors should receive a notice (in 
plain English) before investing, explaining the importance of 
diversification.216 Taking a page out of Thaler’s book, it might be further 
required that these notices show how retirement income flows would 
differ in different scenarios—some involving diversified portfolios, 
others with portfolios highly concentrated in a few key stocks. 217 
Investors might be required to certify that they understand that “projected 
. . . income typically doubles as an employee switches from a concentrated 
portfolio with a single stock to a diversified portfolio.”218 The SEC could 
even require the potential investor to take a quiz on finance theory, 
although this last requirement is likely to be too onerous to help. A 
second, more intrusive and paternalistic option is to impose a second layer 
of capping targeted at individual investment sizes. While each investor 
would remain limited to investing the greater of 10% of his net worth or 
income per year, he will also be limited from investing more than 20% of 
this overall cap on any one company. This would encourage investors to 
diversify at least modestly; however, it might also encourage investors to 
put money in less-than-ideal companies simply to ensure that they have 
the maximum possible amount of capital deployed. This may also limit 
certain investors to investments too small to be worthwhile. 
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3. Intrastate Emphasis 
Intrastate offerings should be encouraged to the extent possible. This 
runs somewhat counter to the “democratizing access to capital” rationale, 
but given that the case for a regional equity gap is weak and that firms 
with local investors engage in less undesirable activity, intrastate 
fundraising offers a clear advantage over more dispersed fundraising 
campaigns. Intrastate offerings could be directly encouraged through a 
number of mechanisms, such as tax breaks, decreased disclosure and 
reporting requirements, and expedited review. These mechanisms could 
be used individually or in tandem. 
However, we need not place undue focus on encouraging purely 
intrastate offerings. Syndicated offerings involving at least one local lead 
investor capture many of the same benefits of intrastate offerings without 
unduly limiting the pool of available capital. Thus, the most elegant 
solution (and likely the most cost-effective one) is to focus on 
syndication. This task—the encouragement of syndication—is taken up 
below. 
4. Syndication 
Encouraging (or requiring) syndication with one large “lead” 
investor is likely the most powerful measure available to the SEC to 
minimize the risks of crowdfunding to retail investors. This is, after all, 
the mechanism venture capitalists and angel investors use to make 
prudent long-distance investments, and while it is not a perfect fit for the 
retail crowdfunding context it could certainly ameliorate the collective 
action problems described above. And in fact, in the United Kingdom at 
least one crowdfunding platform explicitly endorses this model by 
encouraging large angel investors to partner with a crowd of small retail 
investors.219 Unfortunately, it is far from obvious how syndication can be 
best encouraged by regulators. 
One forceful way to encourage syndication would be to require that 
each Regulation A+ raise have at least one investor who monitors the 
company and attends all company board meetings. This measure, 
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however, would be highly paternalistic and difficult to enforce in practice. 
A less forceful method might provide reduced fraud liability or disclosure 
requirements for companies who do a Regulation A+ raise involving at 
least one “lead investor.” Yet this solution has problems of its own—
namely, that it would be difficult to define “lead investor” in a way that 
ensures the person acting as lead investor provides meaningful 
monitoring, oversight, and mentoring to the company. 
Luckily, coercive measures may prove to be entirely unnecessary. 
There is at least some reason to think that market forces are capable of 
addressing the problem without the need for government intervention. In 
a recent working paper, MIT Sloan Professor Christian Catalini suggests 
that syndication may be the “killer app” of equity crowdfunding and 
observes that syndication has already arisen naturally as a method for 
division of labor between geographically dispersed angel investors.220 To 
illustrate his point, Catalini explores AngelList’s syndication system in 
depth. Under AngelList’s system, lead investors perform in-person due 
diligence and deal sourcing in exchange for receiving a share of the profits 
earned by geographically dispersed “backer” investors who simply supply 
additional capital for the syndicated deal.221 In this way, the lead investor 
is able to leverage his reputation and diligence efforts while the passive 
investors are able to outsource the task of vetting and monitoring the 
investment. 222  This division of labor arrangement has proven so 
compelling that syndicated deals are now vastly more common than non-
syndicated deals on AngelList, despite the syndication option having only 
become available in July 2013.223 Importantly, the median investment 
amount in these syndicated deals is a mere $2500,224 which implies that 
transaction costs will not be a barrier to bringing syndication to retail 
equity crowdfunders (who generally only have small sums of money to 
invest). 
Of course, a trade-off is inherent here: the more syndication with 
professional investors is encouraged, the less we can expect equity 
crowdfunding to ameliorate the well-documented biases of that powerful 
group. So, syndication is a double-edged sword: it is probably the only 
way to ensure that crowdfunders have a decent chance of evaluating 
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human factors like the cohesiveness of the founding team, yet it has the 
unfortunate effect of fixing in place systemic biases against female- and 
minority-owned companies. Given that market-based syndication 
facilitators have already emerged and that overemphasizing syndication 
risks undermining the social positives of Regulation A+, policymakers 
would do well to use a light touch when implementing reforms designed 
to encourage syndication. 
C. LIMITS OF SECURITIES LAW 
Ultimately, the root of the problem goes much deeper than securities 
law. As the Silicon Valley examination suggests, the birth of a high-tech 
center comes not from a rush of private capital backing commercialization 
efforts, but rather through decades of grants and initiatives aimed at 
enabling early-stage research. This makes sense—given the difficulty of 
capturing the full extent of the social benefits from early-stage research 
(e.g., due to imperfect intellectual property protection), we cannot expect 
private markets to properly fund this public good, no matter how large we 
make the pool of market participants. Thus, to best encourage 
technological advances, this Article proposes increasing grants for early 
stage research and increasing preferential tax treatment for expenditures 
on research and development. Additionally, as the Kauffman Foundation 
suggests, the cultivation of a professional class of entrepreneurial 
managers is best done not by increasing access to capital but rather 
through programs which facilitate the formation of relationships and the 
transmission of knowledge among entrepreneurs. While federal securities 
law is ill-suited to make this happen, local initiatives (both public and 
private) hold the potential to appreciably further this goal. 
One innovative solution, proposed by Darden professor Saras 
Sarasvathy, is to focus federal funds and initiatives on the task of 
educating investors.225 Ideally, the principles of investing would be taught 
in public schools of all levels, with more advanced courses available on a 
community-by-community basis at community colleges and the like. 
Funding and resources could be provided to support the formation of local 
investment clubs. Even relatively sophisticated parties, such as executives 
in manufacturing companies, could benefit from educational programs 
tailored towards explaining how to evaluate potential equity-based 
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partnerships and joint ventures with up-and-coming startup companies. If 
well designed, such programs could constitute a powerful “carrot” to 
complement the “stick” of SEC sanctions and review. Indeed, a 
comprehensive program of this type would address nearly every pitfall 
described in Section IV.A above: it would minimize irrationalities 
exhibited by naïve investors (by explaining away myths and introducing 
rational investment practices); it would increase the proportion of 
intrastate investment (thereby increasing the level of active monitoring); 
it would encourage diversification (by allowing small groups to share in 
the work of vetting investments, thereby making placing several small 
bets a more economically viable choice); and it would help investors 
guard against fraud (since investors could draw on their instructors and 
fellow club members to help spot fraudulent investment opportunities). 
CONCLUSION 
Regulation A+ holds some promise, but also much danger. Two 
prominent rationales for the measure—democratizing access to capital 
and reinvigorating the IPO market—appear to be largely baseless. 
However, Regulation A+ has the potential to ameliorate much of the 
systematic bias observed in the venture capital industry regarding female- 
and minority-founded companies. Additionally, Regulation A+ may well 
develop a niche within the early-stage capital ecosystem as a source of 
funds for community projects. As laudable as these advances are, we must 
remember that Regulation A+’s promise to change the status quo 
necessarily implicates new risks. In particular, Regulation A+ invites 
fraud, risks bankrupting ordinary investors, and is likely to have a 
negative impact on corporate governance. While its ultimate impact is 
impossible to determine ex ante, certain amendments and supplements 
would undoubtedly help ensure that its ultimate goal—economic 
development—is achieved with only minimal harmful side effects. These 
include heightened anti-fraud liability, measures designed to encourage 
diversification, and increased incentives to syndicate. A more 
comprehensive plan would go beyond securities law by instituting 
educational programs combined with seeding the formation of local 
investment clubs, thereby ensuring that retail equity crowdfunders have 
the tools they need to properly navigate the choppy waters of this new 
asset class. 
